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IBSEC-CSS-M-46
23 April 1971

COMPUTER SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting
Held at CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia
23 April 1971

^{sixth}
1. The forty-~~fifth~~ meeting of the Computer Security Subcommittee of the United States Intelligence Board Security Committee was held on 23 April 1971 between 0930 and 1150 hours in Room 4E-64, CIA Headquarters Building. In attendance were:

[Redacted]

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Mr. Terence J. Shea, State Member

[Redacted]

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*Mr. Thomas A. Eccleston, Army Member

*Mr. Robert B. Cameron, Navy Member

Capt. William Gilbride, Air Force Alternate

[Redacted]

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Mr. Donald R. Roderick, FBI Member

[Redacted]

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Mr. William S. Donaldson, Jr., Air Force

[Redacted]

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*Attended part of the meeting

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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2. The security level of the meeting was announced as Top Secret COMINT.

3. Approval of Minutes: The minutes of the 2 April 1971 Subcommittee Meeting (M-45) were approved without change.

4. Training Course Task Team Status Report: In the absence of Mr. Cameron during part of the meeting, [] presented a status report on the activities of the Training Course Task Team. The team had met a number of times since the previous Computer Security Subcommittee Meeting and had been assisted in their efforts by [] of the Information Science Center.

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5. [] reported that five alternatives had been identified for handling the administration of the proposed computer security course; viz., identification of an executive agency to administer the course utilizing existing facilities, course development and presentation under external contract, operation of the course as a multi-agency effort, direct sponsorship of the course by the Computer Security Subcommittee, and independent administration of the course by an individual USIB member. It was explained that the Task Team had investigated the use of existing facilities for the course including the Department of Defense Computer Institute, the Information Science Center, the National Cryptologic School, and the Foreign Service Institute. A preliminary opinion of the Task Team suggested the advantages of DODCI, especially since it appeared willing to take on the project. Initial contact with the other facilities reflected that they were either not prepared to conduct the course or needed substantial assistance, e.g., in the form of additional manpower and funds, if they were to assume this responsibility.

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6. In this discussion [] noted that CIA may be in a position to offer its resources for course development and administration, but that a final decision on this offer had not yet been made. [] indicated that the Air Intelligence Center at Lowry Air Force Base had not been thoroughly investigated

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as a possible site for the course; however, he agreed to look into it in more detail by the next meeting.

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8. The Chairman and others took some issue with [redacted] report. The Chairman himself specifically noted:

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a. The Task Team was not requested and should not draw any conclusions or make any recommendation with reference to the alternatives reviewed;

b. Previous Subcommittee discussion concluded that DODCI would not satisfactorily meet the requirements of the Intelligence Community in providing training in the computer security area, since a significant part of the problems encountered in the Community are not generally found throughout the defense establishment;

c. The funding requirement estimates, which [redacted] explained included the construction of SI-TKH secure areas, were extravagant. Indeed, any mention of figures of the magnitude given could hastily terminate any further discussion of a course.

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9. The Chairman requested that the CIA member pursue further his discussions in his own agency about the possibility of CIA developing and presenting the course.

10. The Chairman also reminded the Task Team that their report was anticipated by 30 April 1971.

11. Also in the course of the discussion of the proposed training course, [redacted] exhibited a draft questionnaire

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designed to solicit from individual agencies the numbers of students anticipated for the course as well as the degree of support each agency might be able to provide. The Chairman and others commented that the requirement for the course had already been well established and a large student population is identified. He suggested that, although he did not object to the distribution of the questionnaire, the information that might be collected would be of minimal use at this stage of the planning process.

12. Guidelines for ADP Catastrophe Planning and Contingency Backup Planning: Discussion of these proposed guidelines was once again deferred due to time limitations.

13. Security Responsibilities in Bilateral Interagency Computer Links: The Chairman distributed to members a revised draft of this paper; the revisions conformed to the views expressed by members at the earlier meeting, especially concerning the desirability of excluding its application to computer networks. Members were solicited for their concurrence or comment on the revised version by the next meeting.

14. Other Business:

a. DCID No. 6/3 Annex E Working Group: The Chairman reported that the working group established to revise Annex E of DCID No. 6/3 had not yet met, although it had been suggested to him by the working group chairman that he might prepare the first draft of a revised Annex. In the event that this came to pass, members were requested to submit any changes to the original Annex E, so that this first draft might encompass the views of all USIB agencies.

b. Sterilized Version of DCID No. 1/16: The Chairman announced that copies of the sterilized DCID No. 1/16 had been distributed at the Security Committee Meeting of 13 April. He called particular attention to the handling instructions outlined in the cover memorandum of this paper.

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c. Guidelines for Security Analysis, Testing, and Evaluation of Resource-Sharing Computer Systems:

The Chairman announced that all USIB members had approved the testing guidelines previously disseminated.

d. USCSB Vote Action: Making reference to the vote action within the United States Communications Security Board concerning the establishment of a USCSB Computer Security Committee or a joint USCSB/USIB group, the Chairman reported that he had not received any word of the results of the vote action.

e. NATO Computer Security Working Group: The Chairman announced that he had recently received correspondence indicating that the NATO Security Committee was considering the establishment of a Computer Security Working Group. The DIA member indicated that he was aware of the consideration being given this proposal and would keep the Subcommittee informed of its development.

f. Computer Science and Engineering Board Meeting: The Chairman announced that he had attended the regular Board meeting held the previous day at the National Academy of Science. The meeting was of particular importance in that the proposal to establish a CS&EB computer security panel had been approved. As mentioned earlier, this panel will undertake a study of the computer security problem as it exists in the non-government environment. The Chairman also announced that the CS&EB is completing a study of the growth of computer technology in Japan; later, it has already decided, a similar study of the USSR is planned.

g. DIAOLS Test: With the publication of DCID No. 1/16 and the dissemination and approval of the testing guidelines, the DIA member announced that his organization

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was ready to begin the security test of the DIA On-Line System (DIAOLS). In consonance with the earlier discussion of this proposed test in the IHC and SECOM environments, DIA is hoping to have Community participation in the test.

The DIA member requested that members informally determine the extent to which their separate agencies would participate in the test and let him know telephonically by 28 April. As a guide he distributed copies of proposed test environment areas for various Community agency participants. He pointed out that the services are not being included as active test participants and emphasized the DIA desire to begin the test by about 14 May; it will last for approximately ninety days.

Discussion of the DIA request suggested a need for having the test plan available when individual agencies are solicited for support. The DIA member indicated that this plan is currently being revised and would not be ready for distribution in time.

Since it seemed that members could not respond to the DIA request on a timely basis, the Chairman suggested that he meet with appropriate DIA personnel and the Chief, IHC Support Staff, early in the week of 26 April to discuss approaches to recruiting Community support for the test. In addition he sought to clarify the role of such Community participants in the test. The DIA member responded favorably to this suggestion and arrangements were made for such a meeting. To complement these arrangements and to further assist in the recruitment of non-DIA assistance, it was suggested that the subject be further discussed at the next Computer Security Subcommittee Meeting and possibly also at the IHC meeting scheduled for 28 April.


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15. Next Subcommittee Meeting: Due to the priority of current Subcommittee efforts, the next meeting was scheduled for 0930 hours on 30 April.

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 Chairman
Computer Security Subcommittee

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